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INTRODUCTION
A few short years ago, one article questioned whether 2012 would
be the year of subscription-based services.1  Indeed, subscription-based
business models have become increasingly prevalent in recent years.2
For example, Graze, founded in 2009, delivers a box of healthy snacks to
* University of California, San Diego, B.S. 2011; Cornell Law School, J.D., 2017.  Sin-
cere thanks to my colleagues at the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for their invalua-
ble feedback, suggestions, and editorial labors. I am also immensely grateful to my family and
friends for their love and support.
1 Kelly Clay, Will 2012 Be The Year of Subscription-Based Services?, LOCKER GNOME
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.lockergnome.com/news/2012/01/09/will-2012-be-the-year-of-sub
scription-based-services/.
2 See Meegan B. Brooks & Stephanie A. Sheridan, 2nd Wave of Auto-Renewal Lawsuits
Attack Business Model, LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/687618/2nd-
wave-of-auto-renewal-lawsuits-attack-business-model.
197
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its customers on a weekly or biweekly basis.3  Graze customers’ sub-
scriptions continue indefinitely until a customer affirmatively cancels.4
In 2014, Graze saw its sales grow thirty-one percent.5  Other subscrip-
tion-based startups offer various goods ranging from razors to groceries.6
Another class of subscription-based startups, rather than offering
tangible goods, offers services or access to discounts.7  For example,
Tinder—a phone application providing date-matching services—recently
limited the free services it offers and added a subscription-based pre-
mium option.8  On the other hand, JustFab.com is an example of a sub-
scription-based startup that offers a personalized shopping experience
and access to discounts.9  The website sells shoes, clothes, and accesso-
ries at a discount for its subscribers.10  In addition, each month it gener-
ates a digital “personalized boutique,” which contains various items that
are selected based on a style quiz taken by the customer and the cus-
tomer’s past shopping preferences.11  Once a customer makes a purchase
from JustFab.com, he or she is enrolled as a member of the website and
charged a monthly fee of $39.95.12  This fee is converted to store credit,
which the customer can only use to purchase goods from the website (the
customer cannot “cash out” the accumulated store credit).13
Negative option marketing lies at the heart of subscription-based
business models like those employed by Graze and JustFab.com.  In
most sales transactions, customers must affirmatively accept an offer in
order for a transaction to move forward.14  However, negative option
marketing turns this proposition on its head by assuming that a cus-
tomer’s silence, or failure to affirmatively reject goods or services, con-
stitutes acceptance of an offer.15  Thus, in order to cancel a transaction,
3 See How it Works, GRAZE (Oct. 17, 2015, 4:29 PM), https://www.graze.com/help/
how-it-works; Jon Yeomans, Graze Boxes Up 31% Sales Growth, THE GROCER (Sep. 24,
2014), http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/finance/results/graze-boxes-up-31-sales-growth/372023.
article.
4 See How it Works, supra note 3. R
5 Yeomans, supra note 3. R
6 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
7 See id.
8 See Alyssa Newcomb, Why Tinder Is Charging People Over 30 More for Tinder Plus,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/tinder-charging-people-30-tin
der/story?id=29335809.
9 See How it Works, JUSTFAB (Oct. 17, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.justfab.com/how-
justfab-works.htm.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing, 36
AM. BUS. L.J. 377, 378 (1999).
15 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(t) (2010).  However, one should note that a customer must take
some step to enter into the negative option relationship (for example, by engaging in an initial
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subscription, or agreement a customer must exercise a negative option by
affirmatively rejecting the transaction, subscription, or agreement.16  For-
mally, the Federal Code of Regulations defines negative option market-
ing as follows: “Negative option feature means, in an offer or agreement
to sell or provide any goods or services, a provision under which the
customer’s silence or failure to take an affirmative action to reject goods
or services or to cancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as ac-
ceptance of the offer.”17
Negative option marketing may provide benefits to both customers
and sellers.  Customers might receive the benefit of convenience, or un-
interrupted service or product shipments.18 In addition, to the extent that
sellers save money and increase revenue through negative option market-
ing, sellers can pass on some of the savings to customers in the form of
lower prices.19  On the other hand, sellers potentially benefit from lower
costs and increased revenue, which they may achieve through various
mechanisms.20  For example, sellers may be able to stock inventory more
efficiently and may be able to avoid renewal costs.21
Notably, while negative option marketing is increasingly popular
among subscription-based sellers, customer reactions have been mixed.22
For example, a quick search of “graze box reviews” pulls up links such
as “The Best Delivery Snack Packages in the U.S.,” while a quick search
of “JustFab reviews” pulls up links including “JustFab: Not So Fab After
All” and “JustFab’s Checkout Tactics Are JustShady.”23  Indeed,
JustFab.com was recently involved in several lawsuits questioning its
business practices.24  In one such lawsuit, JustFab.com sued the website
transaction with the seller). See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative
Option Marketing, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 377, 381–82 (1999) (stating that contracts cannot be
“foisted” upon people, and therefore negative options usually involve an underlying or master
contract that has formal mutual consent).
16 See Bowal, supra note 14, at 378. R
17 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(t).
18 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, NEGATIVE OPTIONS: A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE
FTC’S DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 4 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/negative-options-fed
eral-trade-commission-workshop-analyzing-negative-option-marketing.
19 See id. at 5.
20 See id. at 3.
21 See id. at 3.
22 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
23 Brooke Porter Katz, The Best Delivery Snack Packages in the U.S., SERIOUS EATS
(Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.seriouseats.com/2014/04/the-best-delivery-snack-packages-in-
us.html; Zuska, JustFab.com: Not So Fab After All, LITERALLY, DARLING (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.literallydarling.com/blog/2014/01/10/justfab-not-so-fab/#; Alexia Tsotsis,
JustFab’s Checkout Tactics Are JustShady, TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 27, 2013), http://techcrunch
.com/2013/09/27/not-so-vip/.
24 See Catherine Shu, Fab.com Files Counterclaim Against JustFab, Says JustFab is a
“Predatory” Bargain Clothing Peddler, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 1, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/
2013/11/01/fabcounterclaim/; Press Release, Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office, Online
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Fab.com for trademark infringement and Fab.com countersued, claiming
that JustFab.com’s “questionable business practices” had injured
Fab.com’s own reputation.25  Later, after racking up thousands of Better
Business Bureau complaints, JustFab.com paid $1.8 million to settle a
class action lawsuit alleging that the company had misled customers into
agreeing to subscriptions.26  Significantly, these lawsuits reflect a larger
trend.27  The end of 2014 and early-2015 saw a wave of similar class
action lawsuits targeting subscription-based businesses that utilize nega-
tive option marketing.28
Recently, legislators have attempted to address the growing use of
negative option marketing and corresponding customer concerns.29  Spe-
cifically, in both the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and the
Telemarketing Sales Rule, legislators enacted broad provisions regulat-
ing negative option marketing.30  Each provision requires sellers to pro-
vide thorough disclosure and an easy method of cancellation when using
negative option marketing schemes.31  In addition, both provisions work
to provide a broad base of consumer protection by widely applying to all
forms of negative option marketing.32
However, several questions remain.  Why are customers okay with
certain negative option marketing schemes, like Graze, while they feel
defrauded by others, like JustFab.com? Moreover, why do customers
continue to feel defrauded by companies like JustFab.com given the pro-
tections afforded by the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and
the Telemarketing Sales Rule?  This Note addresses these questions with
a focus on subscription-based businesses, which make up a large portion
of the negative option marketing schemes that we see today.  In particu-
lar, this Note argues that certain subscription-based businesses have a
greater potential than other businesses to become predatory.  In taking a
“one-size-fits-all” approach and treating all negative option marketing
schemes in the same manner, current negative option legislation fails to
address this reality.
Specifically, subscriptions offering services or discounts, as op-
posed to tangible goods, pose unique dangers to customers and to the
Fashion Retailer Pays Over $1.8 Million to Settle Consumer Protection Lawsuit for Mislead-
ing Advertising (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/newsroom/newsreleases/
Pages/NRA2014/Online-Fashion-Retailer-Pays-Over-$1-8-Million-to-Settle-Consumer-Protec
tion-Lawsuit-For-Misleading-Advertising.aspx.
25 See Shu, supra note 24. R
26 See Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office, supra note 24. R
27 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
28 See id.
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 8403 (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2015).
30 See legislation cited supra note 29. R
31 See id.
32 See id.
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marketplace.  These unique dangers result largely from the fact that a
customer usually has to take some type of affirmative action to receive
the benefit of services or discounts offered through a subscription.
Where a customer does not periodically receive a tangible good as part of
a subscription, that customer is more likely to forget about the subscrip-
tion and consequently fail to take any action to access its services or
discounts.  Thus, in a subscription offering services or discounts, custom-
ers can potentially pay hundreds or thousands of dollars for services or
discounts that they never access.  As a result, the consequences of con-
sumer inertia, or the tendency of consumers to continue in a given pat-
tern of consumption, can be potentially devastating.
Because of these dangers, this Note suggests that consumers should
have the benefit of added legal protection with regard to subscriptions
offering services or access to discounts.  Specifically, subscriptions of-
fering services or discounts should not be allowed to continue or auto-
matically renew in perpetuity.  Rather, after a period of disuse, the
neglected subscription should terminate unless the customer takes mea-
sures to affirmatively renew the subscription.33 This outcome is appropri-
ate given that prolonged disuse tends to serve as a signal, for the given
transaction and customer, that the benefits of negative option marketing
are outweighed by its costs.  In addition, prolonged disuse may serve as a
signal that the business relationship has become predatory.
Part I discusses early forms of negative option marketing and early
negative option marketing legislation.  Next, Part II describes how the
marketplace has recently evolved to include a growing number of sub-
scription-based businesses.  Part II then goes on to provide an overview
of legislative responses to the increase in subscription-based businesses.
In Part III, this Note shows how these legislative responses leave a regu-
latory gap regarding the dangers associated with subscription-based busi-
nesses offering services and discounts.  Finally, Part IV describes a
potential solution.
I. EARLY NEGATIVE OPTION MARKETING
Negative option marketing first appeared in the American market-
place in the form of book-of-the-month clubs.34  In 1926, Sackheim and
33 Because many payments today are automatic and electronic, affirmative renewal
should constitute more than simply paying a credit card charge. See Will Stancil, A Better
Way to Cancel Your Gym Membership (And Avoid Other Hazards of Autopayment), 2015 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 103, 106 (2015) (“Every day, firms use automatic selling and
preauthorized payments to force buyers into making purchases they don’t really want.”).  On
the other hand, such affirmative renewal could be as simple as clicking a link provided via
email.
34 See Owen R. Phillips, Negative Option Contracts and Consumer Switching Costs, 60
S. ECON. J. 304, 304 (1993).
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Scherman developed a Book-of-the-Month Club (the “Club”), one of the
first such clubs of its kind to emerge.35  Under Sackheim and Scherman’s
original business model, the Club sent a new book to its customers each
month.36  Customers could return the Club’s book selection (with post-
age paid by the Club) if they were unsatisfied.37  In 1947, to save postage
and return costs, the Club began sending a card to each of its customers
announcing the book selection of the month.38  If a customer did not
wish to receive the selection, he or she could return the card to the
Club.39  If a customer did not return his or her card, the Club would
proceed to send the customer that month’s book selection and charge the
customer.40
This business model was later adopted in various other industries,
and book, recording, and video clubs became increasingly popular.41
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) describes the form of negative
option marketing utilized by these clubs as a “pre-notification negative
option plan.”42  Under such a plan, a seller periodically sends notices
offering goods.43  If a customer does not take action to decline the of-
fered good, the seller will proceed to send the good and charge the cus-
tomer.44  Notably, pre-notification negative option plans apply only to
businesses offering goods rather than services.45
While pre-notification negative option plans and other early forms
of negative option marketing offered potential benefits to both customers
and sellers,46 the plans also left the door open to potential abuse by pred-
atory sellers.47  For example, sellers in the 1970s commonly sent unsolic-
ited merchandise to customers who had not entered into any type of
formal agreement with these sellers.48  If customers did not return the
35 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 195 (Jurg Gerber & Eric L. Jensen eds.,
2007).
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See Bowal, supra note 14, at 378–79. R
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 35, at 195; Phillips, R
supra note 34, at 304. R
42 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at i. R
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id. (“[I]n prenotification negative option plans, such as book or music clubs, sell-
ers send periodic notices offering goods. If consumers take no action, sellers send the goods
and charge consumers.”) (emphasis added).
46 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 3–5. R
47 Customers may be “vulnerable to ‘opportunistic offers with a very high price or with
poor terms’” because of the fact that they lack bargaining power in negative option transac-
tions. See id. at 5 (quoting Professor Avery Katz of Columbia Law School).
48 See J.M.S., Legislative Note: The Unsolicited Gift Act, 39 TENN. L. REV.  201, 201–03
(1971).
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unsolicited merchandise—if they “in any way accepted delivery and ex-
ercised dominion over these goods”—sellers would proceed to charge
them for the goods.49  In fact, one Note from the 1970s stated that send-
ing unsolicited merchandise as a means of procuring sales was a “wide-
spread problem.”50
In response to the problem of unsolicited merchandise, Congress
enacted section 3009 of the United States Code in 1970.51  Section 3009
regulates the mailing of unordered merchandise, and states that recipients
may treat unordered merchandise as a gift.52  Thus, where a customer has
not formally entered into a negative option agreement with a seller and
the seller sends the customer unsolicited merchandise, the customer may
keep the merchandise for free and do with it as he or she pleases.53  In
response to abuses of pre-notification negative option plans, the Federal
Trade Commission enacted Section 425 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions in 1973.54  Section 425 provides specific rules that limit sellers
utilizing pre-notification option plans.55  For example, sellers must re-
view clearly and conspicuously the material terms of the plan, and they
cannot substitute merchandise for that ordered by a customer without the
customer’s consent.56  These statutes successfully regulated unsolicited
merchandise and pre-notification negative option plans.57
II. THE RISE OF THE SUBSCRIPTION ECONOMY
A. The Subscription Economy
The negative option landscape of today looks dramatically different
than that of the 1970s.58  In particular, negative option schemes have
49 See id. at 201.
50 See id. at 202–03; 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1971) (regulating unsolicited merchandise); 16
C.F.R. § 425 (1973) (regulating pre-notification negative option plans).
51 See 39 U.S.C. § 3009.
52 See id.
53 See id.; DAVID H. BERNSTEIN & BRUCE P. KELLER, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, MAR-
KETING AND PROMOTIONS § 8.02 (Law Journal Press 2015).
54 See 16 C.F.R § 425.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Bruce A. Craig, Negative Option Billing—Understanding the Stealth Scams of the 90s,
7 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 5, 6 (1994) (“Since regulation, [pre-notification negative option]
plans have not had a significant adverse impact on consumers.”); Dennis D. Lamont, Negative
Option Offers in Consumer Service Contracts: A Principled Reconciliation of Commerce and
Consumer Protection, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1315, 1322 (1995) (“Once Congress and the [Federal
Trade Commission] responded to initial complaints, there appeared a consensus that the
‘problems’ of negative options had been solved, and for practical purposes they were with
respect to merchandising.”).
58 Compare Kyle Hutzler, The Rise of the Subscription Economy, HUFFINGTON POST,
BUSINESS (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kyle-hutzler/rise-of-the-subscription-
economy_b_4548866.html (describing the rise of the “subscription economy”) with Phillips,
supra note 34, at 304 (describing early forms of negative option marketing, which largely R
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become increasingly prevalent.59  This proliferation was made possible
in large part by the rise of the Internet and the development of electronic
billing, both of which make the execution of negative option schemes
easier than ever before.60  The Internet allows companies to market to
many consumers at once.61  Electronic billing then enables companies to
more easily collect customers’ billing information, store this information,
and access their accounts.62  Furthermore, the online behavior of con-
sumers tends to facilitate transactions that a consumer may otherwise be
reluctant to enter.63  For example, the FTC found that those using the
Internet commonly exhibit characteristics including unwarranted confi-
dence, exuberance, and a desire for immediate gratification.64  Particu-
larly troubling is the finding that online consumers tend to be “click
happy,” meaning that they fail to read or understand agreements that they
enter into.65
With negative option marketing schemes easier to execute than ever
before, such schemes have become not only more numerous but also
more varied.66  Today, the FTC recognizes four broad categories of neg-
ative option schemes.67  Pre-notification negative option plans are the
model used by various book, video, and recording clubs.68  Continuity
plans describe negative option marketing schemes in which a customer
agrees ahead of time to receive periodic shipments of goods or provi-
sions of services.69  The customer will continue to receive these goods or
services until he or she affirmatively cancels the agreement.70  Automatic
renewal plans describe negative option marketing schemes in which sell-
ers automatically renew a customer’s subscription until the customer af-
firmatively cancels the subscription.71  Finally, under free-to-pay plans,
consisted of pre-notification negative option plans in the form of book, video, and recording
clubs).
59 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
60 See Stancil, supra note 33, at 109, 123 (noting that automatic selling, which the article R
equates with modern negative-option billing, “thrives online”); id. at 106, 130 (noting that
negative option schemes frequently rely on preauthorized payment schemes perpetuated
through electronic billing).
61 See id. at 109; Bowal, supra note 14, at 390. R
62 See Stancil, supra note 33, at 106 (“Today, [negative options are] facilitated by R
preauthorized debit and credit payments, which enable merchants to obtain payments with
virtually no participation from consumers whatsoever.”).
63 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 7. R
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 2 (describing four different types of plans that fall within the negative option
marketing category).
67 See id.
68 See id. at i.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
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sellers provide goods or services for free (or a nominal fee) during a trial
period.72  After this trial period, sellers begin to charge a fee until the
customer affirmatively cancels the agreement.73
As a result of the increased prevalence and variety of negative op-
tion schemes, today’s consumers are much more likely to be involved in
or affected by such a scheme, predominately via a subscription-based
business.74  Commentators have described this phenomenon as “the sub-
scription economy,” and have noted that today’s consumers are “drown-
ing in digital subscriptions.”75  In today’s subscription economy, items
ranging from software to groceries are offered in the form of periodic
subscriptions.76  For example, The Dollar Shave Club, which delivers
new, high-end razors to customers on a monthly basis, exemplifies how
today’s consumers can (and do) buy almost anything in the form of a
monthly subscription.77  Notably, as subscription-based businesses be-
come increasingly popular, they have tended to displace their non-sub-
scription-based predecessors.78  This trend is evident, for example, in the
rise of Netflix and the corresponding decline of Blockbuster.79  However,
as more consumers come into contact with subscription-based busi-
nesses, the potential dangers unique to these businesses become all the
more palpable.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Hutzler, supra note 58. R
75 See id.; Tien Tzuo, The Subscription Economy: A Business Transformation, MEDIUM
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://medium.com/@tientzuo/the-subscription-economy-a-business-trans-
formation-83d6fb24a2f9#.v5do3wp9h; Bennett Voyles, The Subscription Economy: Why Sub-
scriptions Are More Popular Than Ever, CKGSB KNOWLEDGE (Jun. 17, 2015), http://
knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2015/06/17/marketing/the-subscription-economy-why-subscriptions-
are-more-popular-than-ever/; Josh Jennings, You Can’t See It All: Subscriptions In Theory and
Practice, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digi
tal-life-news/you-cant-see-it-all-subscriptions-in-theory-and-practice-20150922-gjsri3.html.
76 See Hutzler, supra note 58. R
77 See Adam Lashinsky, The Cutting Edge of Care, FORTUNE (Mar. 9, 2015), http://
fortune.com/2015/03/09/dollar-shave-club/.
78 See Hutzler, supra note 58 (describing how subscription-based businesses are edging R
out traditional businesses in areas such as software, music, and automobiles).  For example,
commentators have predicted that enterprise resource planning software, which companies sell
under a traditional positive option, “buy once” plan, will soon be displaced by SaaS (software
as a service, offered on a subscription-basis); see, e.g., Megan O’Neill, How Netflix Ban-
krupted and Destroyed Blockbuster, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.
com/how-netflix-bankrupted-and-destroyed-blockbuster-infographic-2011-3 (describing Net-
flix’s displacement of Blockbuster); Victor Luckerson, Spotify and YouTube are Just Killing
Digital Music Sales, TIME, BUSINESS (Jan. 3, 2014), http://business.time.com/2014/01/03/spot
ify-and-youtube-are-just-killing-digital-music-sales/ (describing how music streaming through
companies like Spotify is displacing digital purchases of music).
79 See O’Neill, supra note 78. R
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B. A Response to the Subscription Economy: New Negative Option
Legislation
As negative option schemes grew increasingly commonplace and
varied, one thing became clear: the specific, targeted regulations of the
1970s no longer provided adequate protection to consumers.80  These
regulations only applied to two specific types of negative option market-
ing: pre-notification negative option plans and unsolicited merchandise.81
In order to fill the regulatory gaps created by the growing negative option
marketplace and new forms of negative option marketing, the FTC and
Congress enacted two new pieces of legislation.82  The Telemarketing
Sales Rule, enacted by the FTC in 1995, applies to all forms of negative
option marketing when such marketing occurs over the telephone.83  Sec-
tion 8403 of the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act, enacted in
2010 by Congress, applies to all forms of negative option marketing
when such marketing occurs on the Internet.84  Notably, several states
have also followed suit, adopting new statutes that further regulate nega-
tive option marketing to varying degrees.85
The Telemarketing Sales Rule, section 8403, and many state laws
targeting negative option schemes all share a common approach to the
regulation of negative option schemes.86  Specifically, each of these laws
and regulations focus on disclosure.87  Companies engaged in negative
option marketing schemes must “clearly and conspicuously” disclose the
material terms of negative option transactions.88  Examples of material
terms requiring disclosure include whether a customer’s card will be
charged periodically, the frequency and duration of recurring charges,
when customers must cancel a transaction to avoid recurring charges,
and how customers may cancel transactions.89  Furthermore, disclosures
80 See Mark T. Spriggs & John R. Nevin, Negative Option Plans: Current Forms Versus
Existing Regulations, 15 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 227, 236 (1996) (suggesting various
policy recommendations in response to new forms of negative option selling (prior to the
enactment of the Telemarketing Sales Rule and section 8403)).
81 See 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (2012); 16 C.F.R § 425 (2015).
82 See 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 8403 (2012).
83 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 8403.
85 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
86 Most of these regulations require clear and conspicuous disclosure of the material
terms in a negative option agreement. See id.; 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403.
87 See Brooks, supra note 2 (noting that state statutes vary in strictness but “generally R
require companies to disclose automatic renewal policies in a clear and conspicuous manner”);
16 C.F.R. § 310 (requiring disclosure of “all material terms and conditions” of a negative
option feature marketed or sold over telephone); 15 U.S.C. § 8403 (requiring disclosure of “all
material terms” of negative option transactions effected on the Internet).
88 See Brooks, supra note 2; 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403. R
89 See FTC v. Health Formulas, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-01649-RFB-GWF (D. Nev. 2015)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
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must be “unavoidable” in order to be clear and conspicuous.90  For ex-
ample, in print communications, disclosures must stand out from accom-
panying text because of type size, location, or other characteristics.91
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT NEGATIVE OPTION
LEGISLATION
While the Telemarketing Sales Rule and section 8403 are a step in
the right direction in terms of providing increased protection to consum-
ers, a regulatory gap remains.  This gap is evident in a recent wave of
lawsuits aimed at subscription-based businesses, and serves to demon-
strate increasing consumer dissatisfaction with the deceptive market
practices of these businesses.92  These lawsuits initially targeted the mu-
sic and gaming industries.93  However, by 2014, the scope of targeted
industries expanded to include other service-based subscription compa-
nies such as SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., AAA Inc., Blizzard En-
tertainment Inc., and Tinder Inc.94  In addition, in 2014, the FTC brought
actions for the first time under section 8403, demonstrating its increased
motivation to enforce the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act’s
negative option provision and suggesting more such lawsuits to come.95
Perhaps most telling is the fact that consumers remain dissatisfied
with certain companies even when these companies disclose the nature of
a negative option transaction.96  For example, in 2014 JustFab.com set-
tled a class action lawsuit founded upon allegations that the company
misled customers about subscription fees.97  Pursuant to this settlement,
JustFab.com revised its disclosure policies to make it clearer that cus-
tomers were entering into a subscription.  However, customer complaints
about the company’s marketing practices continued to pour into the Bet-
ter Business Bureau and the FTC, alleging insufficient notice of the neg-
ative option agreement.  As a result, JustFab.com recently announced
that it is again “reviewing its tactics and customer service practices.”98
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See Benjamin Stein, FTC Brings First Actions Under the Restore Online Shoppers’
Confidence Act, INFO. L. GROUP (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2014/11/arti
cles/ftc/ftc-brings-first-actions-under-the-restore-online-shoppers-confidence-act/.
96 See, e.g., Kim Bhasin, JustFab is Reviewing Customer Service Practices as Com-
plaints Pile Up, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-10-30/justfab-is-reviewing-customer-service-practices-as-complaints-pile-up (noting that
JustFab has continued to receive a barrage of customer complaints even after settling a class
action lawsuit regarding its misleading advertising practices).
97 See id.
98 See id.
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Other recent lawsuits have also featured subscription-based businesses
that appear to disclose the negative option nature of a transaction and to
provide easy methods of cancellation.99  This trend implies that current
laws do not provide adequate protection to consumers, who continue to
feel defrauded despite the provision of disclosure and cancellation
methods.100
The Telemarketing Sales Rule and section 8403 ultimately fail to
provide adequate protection to consumers in today’s negative option
market precisely because they treat all negative option schemes in the
same manner.  As a result of this one-size-fits-all approach, the
Telemarketing Sales Rule and section 8403 fail to account for the fact
that some forms of negative option marketing have a greater potential
than others to become abusive or predatory through their reliance on con-
sumer inertia. This section explores the shortcomings of these regulations
by examining the role of consumer inertia in negative option schemes
generally and the enhanced potential for the exploitation of consumer
inertia present in subscriptions involving services or discounts.
A. The Role of Consumer Inertia in Negative Option Schemes
All negative option schemes have the potential to become preda-
tory.101  Under traditional business models, customers must affirmatively
consent to every transaction that takes place between themselves and a
company.102  Under negative option schemes, customers, through an ini-
tial decision to enter into a negative option agreement, allow companies
to assume that silence constitutes acceptance of offers made by the com-
pany.103  Thus, in negative option schemes, customers give up some of
their authority to affirmatively approve individual transactions.104  The
potential problem with this change of control—from consumer to com-
pany—lies in the fact that companies are self-interested.105  Simply put,
consumers are imparting additional control over the charging of their ac-
counts to companies with potentially adverse interests.106  In this man-
99 See Brooks, supra note 2. R
100 See Stancil, supra note 33, at 129 (“One doesn’t need to conduct a detailed investiga- R
tion into regulations affecting automatic selling to deem them inadequate . . . .”).
101 See id. at 125 (describing how negative option plans “[place] consumers at [a] disad-
vantage, and directly [incentivize] bad behavior by sellers”).
102 See Spriggs, supra note 80, at 228. R
103 See id. at 228, 231.
104 See Bowal, supra note 14, at 378–79 (describing how negative option marketing trans- R
forms a transaction from one in which the consumer controls the offer to one in which the
seller has the upper-hand).
105 See Stancil, supra note 33, at 117 (stating that the competing interests of consumers R
and companies “mean that merchants are rewarded for obstructing customers”).
106 See id.
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ner, the very structure of negative option agreements opens the door to
potentially predatory and abusive behavior by companies.107
One of the main ways in which this shift in control encourages abu-
sive practices is through the exploitation of consumer inertia.108  Con-
sumer inertia describes the tendency of consumers to continue in a given
pattern of consumption.109  According to one definition, consumer inertia
is “a failure to take action when more careful assessment of the situation
would lead to action.”110  Thus, consumer inertia means that consumers
often choose the “do nothing” option rather than an option requiring ac-
tion.111  Under negative option schemes, in contrast to traditional trans-
actions, the “do nothing” option results in a sale.112  As a result,
subscription-based companies actually bet on high rates of inertia, and
this bet has proven to be a fruitful one.113  For example, a study of sev-
enty-two telephone companies found that sales of services were thirty-
five percent higher when these services were offered under a negative
option scheme, as compared to when customers had to affirmatively or-
der these services.114
Unfortunately, in encouraging the exploitation of consumer inertia,
negative option schemes encourage economically inefficient transac-
tions.115  The very definition of consumer inertia states that consumers
would take action given “a more careful assessment of the situation.”116
This definition implies that, by failing to take action due to consumer
inertia, consumers are choosing the less-favorable or less-efficient
path.117  Thus, when negative option schemes exploit consumer inertia,
107 See id. at 125 (“[A]utomatic selling . . . creates opportunity for unscrupulous
merchants.  Its economic characteristics can be exploited to burden consumers with unsought
purchases and invisible payments.  This practice fundamentally alters the way transactions
occur, placing consumers at an inherent disadvantage, and directly incentivizing bad behavior
by sellers.”).
108 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding By Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV 1, 37–38 (2013).
109 See BARRY BABIN & ERIC HARRIS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 317 (Cengage Learning, 7th
ed. 2016).
110 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ENCOURAGING CONSUMERS TO ACT AT RENEWAL: EVI-
DENCE FROM FIELD TRIALS IN THE HOME AND MOTOR INSURANCE MARKETS 7 (2015).
111 See MARTIN J. EVANS, LISA O’MALLEY & MAURICE PATTERSON, EXPLORING DIRECT
& CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 278 (Thomson, 2nd ed., 2001).
112 See id.
113 See Hutzler, supra note 58. R
114 See Lamont, supra note 57, at 1330–31 (citing FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS- R
SION, INSIDE WIRE SURVEY (1988) (compiled by Mr. Thomas Petras, Accounting & Audit
Division, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission)).
115 Through such exploitation, buyers might enroll in a negative option plan even where
the selling price of the plan is higher than the buyer’s reservation price (the highest price that
the buyer is otherwise willing to pay).  In this manner, “the seller sells a product that would not
have sold in a positive option system.” See Spriggs, supra note 80, at 227–28. R
116 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 110, at 7. R
117 See Spriggs, supra note 80, at 227–28. R
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consumers inevitably are at risk of paying for goods or services that they
do not want, do not use, and would otherwise not have chosen to
purchase.118  As a result, consumers are deprived of funds that they oth-
erwise could have used in a more efficient or utility-maximizing
manner.119
Furthermore, consumer funds are allocated inefficiently to compa-
nies.120  Rather than being allocated to companies based upon the quality
or utility of the goods and services they provide, the exploitation of con-
sumer inertia encourages the allocation of funds to companies based
upon the structure of a given transaction.121  Companies will inevitably
have less incentive to develop or maintain the quality of the goods and
services that they provide where the structure of a transaction is the pri-
mary force driving sales.  As a result, more time and money will be spent
developing business models that can capitalize on consumer inertia and
less will be expended on research and development.  Adding insult to
injury, this time and money will likely be spent developing the “sneaki-
est” business model possible (with the least notice, disclosure, etc.) that
is still within compliance of the law.
B. The Unique Dangers of Negative Option Schemes Involving
Services and Discounts
As discussed above, current laws have gone a long way toward ad-
dressing some of these concerns.122  However, these laws fail to recog-
nize that one particular category of negative option agreements poses
special dangers.123  Specifically, under subscriptions involving services
or discounts, the validity of “silence as acceptance” is questionable.  In
order for silence to constitute acceptance, as it does under negative op-
tion agreements, one of four circumstances should occur:
• The buyer receives benefits that imply acceptance.
• The buyer takes or retains possession of property.
• Previous dealings indicate that silence or inaction is
acceptance.
118 See Stancil, supra note 33, at 125. R
119 Consumers maximize utility when their reservation price equals a product or service’s
selling price. See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 218 (Cambridge
University Press, 2nd ed., 1981).
120 See Spriggs, supra note 80, at 236 (noting that negative option plans can be R
anticompetitive).
121 See supra note 114 (describing a study in which sales of the same type of services R
were forty-five percent higher when offered under a negative option plan).
122 See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3009; 16 C.F.R § 425; 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403.
123 Both the Telemarketing Sales Rule and Section 8403 fail to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of negative option agreements. See 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403.  Specific
regulations do exist, but so far these only target pre-notification plans, unsolicited merchan-
dise, and the cable industry. See 39 U.S.C. § 3009; 16 C.F.R § 425; 47 C.F.R. § 76.981.
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• The seller indicates that acceptance may be commu-
nicated by silence or inaction, and the buyer, in remain-
ing silent or inactive, intends to accept the offer.124
Each of these circumstances relies on the assumption that a consumer is
aware that an exchange has occurred.125
While the Telemarketing Sales Rule and Section 8403 require
proper disclosure of the material terms of a negative option agreement,
this disclosure does not automatically result in consumer awareness of
the exchange.126  In today’s marketplace, consumers, particularly those
online, often fail to read and fully understand the terms of transactions
that they enter into.127  In subscriptions involving tangible goods, the
danger that a consumer may fail to read the terms of a transaction and
thus may fail to realize that an exchange has occurred is partially miti-
gated by the fact that a consumer receives periodic shipments of
goods.128  Acceptance of these shipments should serve to put the con-
sumer on notice of the subscription.129  In contrast, in subscriptions in-
volving services or discounts, the consumer does not receive physical
reminders of the subscription and the potential for this consumer to re-
main unaware of the transaction remains untempered.130
This lack of consumer awareness exacerbates the potential exploita-
tion of consumer inertia, with potentially devastating consequences.131
Because customers are more likely to forget about a subscription involv-
ing services or discounts, they will be less likely to take any type of
124 See Spriggs, supra note 80, at 231 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS R
(1981)).
125 See id.
126 See 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403.
127 See MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 7–8 (Princeton University Press, 2013); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
18, at 7. R
128 The case in which a consumer unwittingly agrees to the terms of a negative option
agreement and then accepts deliveries of goods pursuant to the agreement should be contrasted
with the case in which a consumer accepts deliveries of unsolicited merchandise.  In the latter
case, a special law overrides the presumption that silence constitutes acceptance where a buyer
takes or retains possession of property. See 39 U.S.C. § 3009.
129 For example, in pre-notification plans, consumers receive periodic announcements
preceding each delivery. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 5.  These periodic no- R
tices may be one of the reasons why consumers complain less about pre-notification plans than
about other forms of negative option marketing. See id.
130 For example, one couple found they were subscribed to over 20 services that they did
not use. See Emma Johnson, This Couple Wasted $7,500 on Unused Subscriptions in 18
Months, FORBES, PERSONAL FINANCE (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmajohn
son/2015/09/04/this-couple-wasted-7500-on-unused-subscriptions-in-18-months/#2715e4857
a0b6a7b055149df.
131 See Bowal, supra note 14, at 379–80 (noting that where consumers do not fully under- R
stand what they have agreed to, debts may “continue to accrue longer than the consumer
expected”).
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affirmative action to cancel these subscriptions.132  As a result, custom-
ers are more likely to accrue tens, hundreds, or thousands of dollars in
charges for services that they never used or for access to discounts that
they never applied.133  In a sense, these customers have received some-
thing for their money—the potential to access services or discounts. The
law recognizes this potential to access services or discounts as valid con-
sideration.134  However, when consumers end up spending thousands of
dollars on services or discounts that they never use, one must ask: given
the realities of consumer behavior and the tendency to forget, should
consumers be able to bargain away a commitment to pay for essentially
nothing in return?135
IV. A SOLUTION
A. Should the Law Interfere?
Given that current laws and regulations appear to leave a gap in
consumer protection against the most predatory negative option schemes,
the question becomes whether, and how, the law should address this gap.
Freedom of contract principles may suggest that the law should not inter-
fere where a consumer and a company have voluntarily entered into a
subscription.136  Arguably, by initially consenting to a subscription, con-
sumers have manifested their judgment that such an agreement is in their
best interest.  One might argue that courts, and companies should not
132 A study by the Financial Conduct Authority found that improved renewal notices did
prompt consumers to switch or negotiate automatically-renewing policies. See FIN. CONDUCT
AUTH., supra note 110, at 3. R
133 One study found that almost half of the population in the United Kingdom admits to
paying for at least one subscription that they are not using. See Alex Wellman, Brits Splashing
£338 Million a Month on “Forgotten” Gym Memberships and TV Streaming Sites (May 11,
2015), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/brits-splashing-338-million-month-5678688.
134 In these cases, the seller has promised to provide a service or discount that the seller is
not otherwise obligated to provide in exchange for the return-promise of the buyer to pay. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
135 Not only do consumers have a tendency to forget, but also a tendency to forget that
they forget. See Keith M. Marzilli Ericson, Forgetting We Forget: Overconfidence and Mem-
ory, 9 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 43, 43 (2011).  The scenario described here might be compared to
other scenarios in which consumers pay but do not necessarily receive a tangible benefit in
return.  For example, in real estate option contracts, a consumer might pay for the option to
buy a piece of land but decide not to exercise the option. See Craig Donofrio, Who Really
Needs A Real Estate Option Contract?, REALTOR.COM (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.realtor.
com/advice/buy/basics-of-real-estate-option-contracts/.  However, real estate options are dis-
tinguished from the negative option scenarios described above in that they usually involve a
predetermined price (rather than ongoing, periodic charges) and a piece of property desired for
its unique characteristics. See id.  Thus, the consumer behaviors that present a danger in nega-
tive option agreements (such as forgetfulness) are not as much of a problem in scenarios such
as real estate options.
136 By definition, freedom of contract is the freedom of parties to create the terms of an
agreement without interference from the government. See LEGAL INFO. INST., WEX (Jan. 5,
2016, 7:00PM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/freedom_of_contract.
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substitute their judgment for a consumer’s initial assertion that such an
agreement is beneficial.  Perhaps it should be up to consumers to monitor
subscriptions that they have voluntarily entered into and to cancel agree-
ments that no longer benefit them.137  In this vein, recall that section
8403 requires negative option marketing that occurs over the Internet to
provide for a simple method of cancellation.138
However, these arguments ignore the realities of consumer behavior
and the disparity in bargaining power between consumers and compa-
nies.139  As described above, consumer habits, such as consumer inertia
and click-happiness, tend to diminish a consumer’s bargaining posi-
tion.140  In addition, modern companies retain significant power over de-
fining the terms of a transaction.141  Contracts are more often composed
of boilerplate terms chosen by the seller and are less often the product of
negotiation between equal parties.142  Realistically, consumers are unable
to change or omit unfavorable terms, and the only option for avoiding
these terms becomes abstaining from the transaction altogether.143  Even
abstention may be impossible where there are few or no alternative prov-
iders, and in such cases the cost of walking away from an unfavorable
contract may exceed the cost of signing (especially given that the mone-
tary cost of goods and services is usually deferred and paid via credit).
The combination of these factors suggests that when making the initial
decision to enter into a negative option agreement, consumers are not
necessarily manifesting their judgment that the agreement is in their best
interest.
As a result of the disparity in bargaining power, precedent leans in
favor of regulation.  Laws have often restricted freedom of contract in
the pursuit of public policy.144  In fact, courts increasingly interpret con-
tracts in a manner meant to protect the reasonable expectations of con-
137 In fact, there are now companies devoted to helping consumers monitor and cancel
subscriptions. See Nick Statt, Trim Seeks Out and Destroys Awful Monthly Subscriptions, THE
VERGE (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/20/10597788/trim-subscription-
canceller-forgotten-bills-texts.
138 See id.
139 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 7 (describing characteristics commonly R
exhibited by online consumers); Bowal, supra note 14, at 378 (describing the disparity in R
bargaining power that exists between consumers and companies in today’s marketplace).
140 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 110, at 7; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, R
at 7. In particular, consumers are overconfident that they can fix any problems that they may
encounter in the future, for example by canceling an agreement in the case of negative option
agreements.
141 See Bowal, supra note 14, at 378. R
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U.
L. REV. 263, 266 (1999).
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tracting parties.145  In the context of subscriptions where consumers have
paid for months or years worth of services or discounts that they have
never used, the most reasonable interpretation seems to be that the con-
sumer has forgotten about the agreement, never intended to sign up in the
first place, or has failed to cancel due to consumer inertia.146  In addition,
customers reasonably expect that they will not have to pay hundreds or
thousands of dollars for nothing.  Thus, public policy suggests that the
law should be able to interfere in instances of subscriptions involving
services and discounts that a customer does not use.
B. How Should the Law Protect Consumers?
How should the law protect consumers against the dangers particu-
lar to subscriptions involving services and discounts?  Ideally, a solution
would be a new law or regulation focused on these specific dangers.147
For example, the targeted negative option marketing provisions 1970s
were largely successful because of their specificity.148  With regard to
subscriptions involving services or discounts, the specific danger in-
volved is that a consumer might forget about or never have intended to
enter into a negative option agreement, that the seller might then take
gross advantage of this due to the negative option structure, and that the
consumer will consequently wind up paying for un-accessed services and
discounts.149  Thus, a targeted law should protect customers from being
charged large amounts of money for services and discounts that they
never use, and should prevent the exploitation of consumer inertia in
these cases.
This Note argues that, under particular circumstances, subscriptions
involving services and discounts should not be allowed to continue in
perpetuity after a consumer initially enters the agreement.  Prolonged
disuse suggests that a subscription has become predatory—that the con-
sumer no longer derives a benefit from the agreement and that the seller
145 See id.  For example, courts have often held provisions of insurance contracts unen-
forceable where they contravene policyholder expectations. See, e.g., DiOrio v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Co., 398 A. 2d 1274, 1280–81 (N.J. 1985).
146 This assumption is reasonable given the realities of consumer behavior. See FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 7; Marzilli Ericson, supra note 135, at 43; BABIN, supra R
note 109, at 317. R
147 The Telemarketing Sales rule and § 8403 already address many of the general dangers
common to all negative option agreements. See 16 C.F.R. § 310; 15 U.S.C. § 8403.  Thus, a
targeted solution is preferable.
148 See Lamont, supra note 57, at 1322 (describing the consensus that the problems asso- R
ciated with pre-notification negative option plans and unsolicited merchandise had been
solved).
149 See Harris, supra note 25 (“Negative option marketers count on the fact that most R
people forget the whole thing and don’t notice charges to their credit card or bank account for
months.”).
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is taking advantage of consumer inertia.  Therefore, after a period of dis-
use, such an agreement should no longer enjoy the benefit of the negative
option structure.  Ideally, this approach would provide for a triggered
“opt in” feature whereby, following a period of one year, a seller must
notify the customer that his or her subscription has not been used for one
year and will be terminated unless the customer affirmatively opts back
into the agreement in some manner.  Such a feature would still allow the
customer to opt into the agreement if he or she is planning to use the
given services or discounts in the future or if he or she deems it to be
beneficial.  Thus, this type of provision would preserve the benefits of
the negative option structure at a minimal cost in cases of legitimate,
beneficial, and efficient agreements—as opposed to wasteful or preda-
tory negative option agreements.
This solution both serves public policy and addresses several of the
concerns inherent in subscriptions offering goods or services.  A trig-
gered opt-in feature would help restore bargaining power to the customer
by putting sellers in the position of having to make a new offer.  Because
they have to make such offers in order to maintain a customer’s business,
sellers would be re-incentivized to develop quality products and services.
Additionally, a triggered opt-in feature would reduce the exploitation of
consumer inertia.  The negative option agreement will be brought a cus-
tomer’s attention once again, and the customer will have had the benefit
of a full year to either utilize the offered services or discounts, or to
realize that he or she does not want these services or discounts.  In either
event, we no longer have the “click-happy” customer that spontaneously
entered into a negative option agreement out of a desire for instant
gratification.
To illustrate, suppose that Jane Consumer is a customer of
JustFab.com.  She has purchased a pair of shoes and has agreed to the
terms of the sale.  Under these terms, JustFab.com enrolls her as a mem-
ber at a cost of forty dollars per month.  For this amount, she can log in
and use her accumulated subscription fees to buy discounted shoes.
However, she never does.  One year passes by, and she has paid 480
dollars for the “potential” to buy shoes from JustFab.com at a discount.
At this point, JustFab.com must send Jane notice that her subscription
will be terminated at the end of the month unless she opts back in.  For
example, JustFab.com might notify Jane of her subscription’s pending
termination via email, and include a link that she can click to “opt in”
and reactivate her subscription.  If Jane opts in, the subscription contin-
ues as it has before.  If the agreement is beneficial to Jane and she does
wish to opt in, the benefits of the negative option structure are preserved
at a minimal cost: clicking a link.  If Jane does not opt in, JustFab.com
must terminate the agreement.  Jane would have lost the money that she
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paid for the year of membership that she did not use.  The only other cost
is the termination of JustFab.com’s income from an agreement that the
consumer no longer wanted or used.  Ultimately, this should encourage
JustFab.com to stop relying on consumer inertia and start marketing
goods or services that actually make a consumer want to continue to “opt
in.”
CONCLUSION
Negative option schemes are increasingly common in today’s sub-
scription economy.  Such agreements have the potential to provide nu-
merous benefits to customers and companies alike.  However, many
commentators have noted the dangers associated with negative option
plans.  The structure of negative option plans gives sellers increased con-
trol over charging consumer accounts, thus heightening the temptation
for companies to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices.  Fortu-
nately, current laws have worked to prevent the most heinous of these
practices by requiring adequate disclosure of the material terms of nega-
tive option transactions and by requiring that sellers provide easy cancel-
lation procedures.  However, what makes negative option agreements
unique is that a subtler, less brazenly fraudulent harm still lurks.  This
harm lies in the fact that the negative option structure encourages compa-
nies to exploit consumer inertia.  Through such exploitation, consumers
may end up paying for goods, services, or discounts that they do not
want.
This harm is especially potent in negative option agreements in the
form of subscriptions involving services and discounts.  Consumers are
more likely to be unaware of these agreements, largely because consum-
ers only receive a tangible benefit when they themselves initiate access
to services or discounts.  In addition, consumers may end up paying for
services and discounts that they never choose to access.  This Note con-
cludes that these dangers would be mitigated by legislation requiring
consumers to affirmatively decide to continue agreements following a
period of disuse.  After such a period, the seller should provide notice to
the buyer that a subscription will be terminated unless the buyer opts
back in to the agreement.  In targeting only subscriptions involving ser-
vices or discounts, and only those agreements in which a consumer has
not affirmatively sought the use of these services or discounts for a pe-
riod of time, this solution singles out the agreements most likely to be
inefficient and abusive.  Thus, this solution preserves the benefits of neg-
ative option agreements while still protecting consumers and the integrity
of the marketplace.
